Presidential Power

Attempts by elected executives to consolidate power have generated alarm and raised concern about democratic backsliding. We study mass attitudes toward the institutional power of the office of the presidency and argue that individuals' democratic values shape views of executive power. Using data from 26 countries in the Americas and 37 countries in Africa, we find support for our perspective. While supporters of the incumbent president express more favorable views toward executive power, we also show that individuals who express stronger commitments to democracy are less supportive of institutional arrangements that favor the executive. Our results demonstrate that attitudes toward the institutions of government are not shaped only by partisanship and other ephemeral political factors, but also by citizens' core commitments to values over governance.

Presidents routinely overpromise and underdeliver, especially amid partisan polarization, narrow congressional majorities, and persistent gridlock. As Congress routinely stymies their legislative agendas, presidents consider alternative courses of action. We study public reactions to unilateral power in the context of congressional inaction. While some research suggests that presidents cannot afford to pass up opportunities to act, more recent scholarship indicates that the public holds negative views of unilateral power and disapproves of its use. Survey experiments conducted with a national sample of Americans provide evidence of the costs of unilateral power. Across three policy areas and between- and within-respondent analyses, the public responds negatively when presidents exercise unilateral power rather than accept the status quo, even among individuals who share the president’s policy views. Our results suggest that while legislative gridlock may increase the appeal of unilateral power, its use may come at a public cost.

This article examines attitudes of the public toward delegation to presidential commissions. Using four survey experiments across a range of contexts, the authors compare public response to the creation of a commission versus direct presidential action. The findings indicate no significant difference in approval for taking action alone or delegating to a commission, at either the policy formulation or implementation stage. Additionally, policies formed by commissions are not seen as more effective than those formed by the president alone.

This article reports a series of survey experiments (N > 7,500) examining whether public support for presidential unilateral action is sensitive to contextual factors such as the president's identity, the unilateral tool used, justifications for action, and the policy pursued. The authors find little evidence that context affects attitudes toward unilateral powers except in circumstances that invoke explicitly political factors. The findings suggest that public attitudes toward unilateral power are generally stable and have implications for understanding how public opinion constrains presidential power.

This article examines public attitudes toward the levers of presidential power using data from a nationally representative survey. The authors find that respondents who provide higher approval ratings of the president are significantly more supportive of presidential powers. The findings suggest that views toward executive power are shaped by presidential approval and that popular presidents can use their prestige to expand the scope of powers available to the presidency.