Presidential Particularism and Divide-the-Dollar Politics
Presidents systematically target federal grant spending to politically important constituencies, especially swing states and core partisan counties, rather than distributing funds universally or based solely on policy efficiency.
Why It Matters
The publication begins with a motivating question: Do presidents allocate federal dollars across the country in a universalistic manner, or do they systematically target politically influential constituencies to further their political goals?
Its central contribution is to show that presidents systematically target federal grant spending to politically important constituencies, especially swing states and core partisan counties, rather than distributing funds universally or based solely on policy efficiency.
It matters because the findings connect institutional choices to the way authority, public responsibility, and political behavior are experienced in practice.
Key Findings
- Presidents are particularistic in allocating federal grants, targeting swing states and core partisan counties.
- Swing state targeting is especially pronounced during presidential reelection years.
- Core partisan counties within swing states receive the largest increases in federal grant spending.
- Presidential particularism produces greater geographic inequality in federal spending than congressional particularism.
Research Design
- Design
- Article
- Data
- Consolidated Federal Funds Report (CFFR) 1984–2008
- Geography
- United States (county-level analysis)
- Time Period
- 1984–2008
- Unit of Analysis
- county-year
- Methods
- County-level quantitative analysis of federal grant spending from 1984 to 2008.; Least-squares regression models with county and year fixed effects.; Use of the Consolidated Federal Funds Report (CFFR) data.
Full Abstract
In a county-level analysis of federal spending from 1984 to 2008, we find that presidents are not universalistic, but particularistic—that is, they reliably direct dollars to specific constituents to further their political goals. Presidents target both counties within swing states and counties in core states that strongly supported the president in recent elections. Swing state particularism is especially salient during presidential reelection years, and core partisan counties within swing states are most heavily rewarded. Our results suggest that presidents systematically prioritize the needs of politically important constituents rather than strictly pursuing visions of good public policy or pandering to the national median voter.
Citation
American Political Science Review 109 (1): 155-171.
- Venue
- American Political Science Review
- Volume
- 109
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 155-171
- DOI
- 10.1017/S0003055414000598