Research Theme
Research on how federal attention, grants, disaster declarations, and public resources move across communities.
Publication Type
Research Pathways
Ohio State Law Journal Online · 2022
This article responds to Pasachoff’s analysis of executive branch control over federal grants, discussing the normative and empirical implications of presidential particularism, especially in the context of partisanship and the Trump administration.
Encyclopedia of Crisis Analysis · 2021
This article examines how public opinion and electoral incentives shape crisis management responses by political leaders, especially U.S.
In times of crisis, citizens look to their leaders for aid and assistance. In the democratic context, the focal figure is likely the chief executive accountable to the whole of the nation. With a specific focus on the American president and the incidences of natural hazards, public opinion and governmental response to these crises are analyzed. While one may expect such a universal actor to aid each according to their need, new scholarship finds that voter behavior and electoral institutions incentivize the president to support only a small slice of the electorate. Empowered by federal disaster relief legislation in the 1950s, the president targets electorally valuable voters when disbursing aid or allocating resources in response to disaster damage. Voters in those areas respond myopically and tend to vote for the incumbent for reasons ranging from economic to emotional. Thus, elites anticipate voter reactions and strategically respond to disasters to mitigate blame or punishment for the event and capitalize on an opportunity for electoral gains.
Legislative Studies Quarterly · 2017
Analyzes presidential co-partisanship in the Senate and the allocation of federal grants.
American Political Science Review
American Political Science Review · 2015
Presidents target federal grant spending toward politically important constituencies, including swing states and core partisan counties.
In a county-level analysis of federal spending from 1984 to 2008, we find that presidents are not universalistic, but particularistic—that is, they reliably direct dollars to specific constituents to further their political goals. Presidents target both counties within swing states and counties in core states that strongly supported the president in recent elections. Swing state particularism is especially salient during presidential reelection years, and core partisan counties within swing states are most heavily rewarded. Our results suggest that presidents systematically prioritize the needs of politically important constituents rather than strictly pursuing visions of good public policy or pandering to the national median voter.
Presidential Studies Quarterly · 2015
This article finds that U.S.
Book
Cambridge University Press · 2015
Executive branch politics can direct federal benefits toward politically valuable communities and produce unequal patterns of public attention.
Emerging Trends in the Social and Behavioral Sciences · 2015
This essay reviews research on how voters and politicians in the United States respond to severe weather events, highlighting key findings and future research directions in the politics of disaster relief.
This essay provides an overview of the research on the politics of disaster relief in the United States, focusing on the response of voters and politicians in the aftermath of severe weather events. It reviews foundational research, discusses recent advances, and addresses important issues for future research on this topic.
Boston University Law Review · 2014
The Electoral College creates incentives for presidents to favor electorally pivotal places over a purely national constituency.
Business and Politics · 2013
The presence of auto workers in a congressional district, not just PAC contributions, strongly predicts legislative support for auto industry bailouts and targeted aid, but this influence does not extend to broader legislation.
In 2008 and 2009, the House of Representatives directed billions of dollars to the auto industry by passing a bailout and the “cash for clunkers” program. Moving beyond corporate influence via campaign contributions, we demonstrate that the presence of auto workers in a district strongly predicts legislative support for both bills. In addition to this critical legislation, we also analyze over 250 bills on which the auto industry either lobbied or took a public position. We find no patterns relating a district’s workers or corporate campaign contributions to these votes on broader legislation where other groups, such as environmental advocates or labor unions, are at the table. Instead, the auto industry garners consistent support only on quasi-private, particularistic legislation. Thus, we contend that on particularistic legislation the presence of workers (not just campaign contributions) drives legislative support; however, when legislators expand the scope of conflict, the influence of a single industry is attentuated by other interests.
American Political Science Review
American Political Science Review · 2012
Voters reward presidents for increased federal spending in their communities, especially in battleground states and when partisan responsibility is clear.
Previous research on the electoral consequences of federal spending has focused almost exclusively on Congress, mostly with null results. However, in a county- and individual-level study of presidential elections from 1988 to 2008, we present evidence that voters reward incumbent presidents (or their party’s nominee) for increased federal spending in their communities. This relationship is stronger in battleground states. Furthermore, we show that federal grants are an electoral currency whose value depends on both the clarity of partisan responsibility for its provision and the characteristics of the recipients. Presidents enjoy increased support from spending in counties represented by co-partisan members of Congress. At the individual level, we also find that ideology conditions the response of constituents to spending; liberal and moderate voters reward presidents for federal spending at higher levels than conservatives. Our results suggest that, although voters may claim to favor deficit reduction, presidents who deliver such benefits are rewarded at the ballot box.
American Journal of Political Science
American Journal of Political Science · 2011
Voters punish presidents and governors for severe weather damage, but reward or punish them more strongly based on their actions in response to disasters, demonstrating that electorates can distinguish between random events and government responsibility.
Are election outcomes driven by events beyond the control of politicians? Democratic accountability requires that voters make reasonable evaluations of incumbents. Although natural disasters are beyond human control, the response to these events is the responsibility of elected officials. In a county-level analysis of gubernatorial and presidential elections from 1970 to 2006, we examine the effects of weather events and governmental responses. We find that electorates punish presidents and governors for severe weather damage. However, we find that these effects are dwarfed by the response of attentive electorates to the actions of their officials. When the president rejects a request by the governor for federal assistance, the president is punished and the governor is rewarded at the polls. The electorate is able to separate random events from governmental responses and attribute actions based on the defined roles of these two politicians.
The Journal of Politics
The Journal of Politics · 2011
Presidents use disaster declarations in electorally strategic ways, linking emergency authority to political incentives.
This article argues that presidents use unilateral powers for particularistic aims to gain electoral support, focusing on presidential disaster declarations. An analysis from 1981 to 2004 finds that a state’s electoral competitiveness influences the likelihood of receiving a disaster declaration, especially after the 1988 Stafford Act expanded presidential powers. Competitive states can expect more disaster declarations, and these decisions yield electoral benefits for presidents, who are rewarded at the ballot box for issuing such declarations.
