The Particularistic President: Executive Branch Politics and Political Inequality
Examines how executive branch politics can produce unequal patterns of federal attention and benefit.
Why It Matters
This book asks how presidential incentives shape the distribution of federal attention and benefits.
Its contribution is to show how executive branch politics can produce unequal geographic patterns in public resources, connecting presidential power to political inequality.
The argument matters because federal governance is experienced locally: where benefits flow, which communities receive attention, and how citizens understand the reach of national authority.
Key Findings
- Presidents can use executive branch discretion to direct attention and benefits toward politically valuable constituencies.
- Executive branch politics helps explain unequal geographic patterns in federal benefits.
- The book links presidential incentives to political inequality and distributive politics.
Research Design
- Design
- Book-length scholarly monograph
Citation
New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015.
- Venue
- Cambridge University Press