Partisanship, Trump, and the Normative Implications of Presidential Particularism: A Response to Pasachoff’s Executive Branch Control of Federal Grants
This article responds to Pasachoff’s analysis of executive branch control over federal grants, discussing the normative and empirical implications of presidential particularism, especially in the context of partisanship and the Trump administration.
Why It Matters
The publication begins with a motivating question: What are the normative and empirical implications of presidential particularism in the allocation of federal grants, and how does the Trump administration compare to previous presidents in this regard?
Its central contribution is to show that this article responds to Pasachoff’s analysis of executive branch control over federal grants, discussing the normative and empirical implications of presidential particularism, especially in the context of partisanship and the Trump administration.
It matters because the findings connect institutional choices to the way authority, public responsibility, and political behavior are experienced in practice.
Key Findings
- Presidents systematically target federal grants to electorally valuable constituencies, such as swing states and core partisan states.
- Republican presidents show stronger evidence of particularistic targeting than Democratic presidents.
- Trump’s actions are consistent with a broader pattern of presidential particularism, though his style may be more overt.
- Normative questions remain about whether strong executive control over distributive policy is desirable compared to alternatives.
Research Design
- Design
- Article
- Data
- Consolidated Federal Funds Report (CFFR) 1984–2010
- Geography
- United States
- Time Period
- 1984–2010 (empirical analysis); Trump administration (discussion)
- Unit of Analysis
- county-year
- Methods
- Extension of prior empirical analysis of federal grant allocation using the Consolidated Federal Funds Report (CFFR) data from 1984–2010.; Regression models with fixed effects for counties and years, examining the impact of swing state and core state status and presidential partisanship.
Citation
Ohio State Law Journal Online 83: 230-246.
- Venue
- Ohio State Law Journal Online
- Volume
- 83
- Pages
- 230-246