Research

Elected municipal clerks are more responsive to constituents and more oriented toward public service than appointed ones. However, selection method has limited impact on ideological or policy preferences.

People who live in coastal communities vulnerable to sea-level rise are more likely to support climate mitigation policies, particularly if they are deeply rooted in their communities. The effect is not strongest among those with the most to lose financially, but among those most tied to place.

Local election officials often see themselves as nonpartisan

Short-distance residential moves within metro areas modestly but clearly reinforce partisan alignment. Even when choices are geographically constrained, Democrats and Republicans sort into neighborhoods that better match their party, incrementally deepening local geographic polarization.

Rural residents report higher levels of neighborhood attachment than urban residents. This variation in place attachment contributes significantly to ideological divides, with contentment predicting conservatism and dissatisfaction predicting liberalism.

Citizens with stronger commitments to democracy consistently express less support for executive power across multiple measures and contexts. While supporters of incumbent presidents favor expanded executive authority, democratic values independently constrain support for executive overreach, suggesting mass publics can serve as a “guardrail” against democratic erosion.

The number of reliable bellwether counties has declined significantly in the era of geographic polarization. Even counties with long records of picking winners have recently lost that predictive power.

Executives who claim responsibility during a crisis are viewed more favorably than those who deflect blame. Blame claiming boosts perceptions of leadership and honesty, even when the crisis is negative.

Local crime rates influence public opinion in complex ways. Higher violent crime correlates with greater support for punitive measures, but people’s personal experience and political predispositions shape how they interpret crime trends.

The American public does not offer presidents a ‘blank check’ to act unilaterally. Instead, support for presidential power is conditional–-shaped by partisanship, trust in government, the policy domain, and the political context. Even partisans often resist expansions of power when used in disfavored ways, suggesting the presence of principled constraints in public opinion.

Presidents frequently receive little or no electoral benefit from policy successes, especially when those policies are complex or lack visibility. Voters often fail to connect improved outcomes with presidential action.

The authors defend and extend their theory of presidential particularism in response to critique. They argue that particularistic policymaking is a persistent and central feature of executive governance, not a marginal or exceptional behavior.

Geographic context systematically influences political attitudes and behaviors, beyond individual traits. Local composition, proximity to others, and community characteristics are central to understanding public opinion and electoral outcomes.

Research on American political institutions and democratic governance.

Presidents are more likely to act unilaterally during national crises, especially when the public demands swift action and institutional constraints are relaxed. The likelihood of unilateral action increases in response to crises in both foreign and domestic policy domains.

Polling places across the United States in the 2016 election generally exhibited high quality. Variation in polling place access, facilities, and practices was largely a function of county and state-level factors, not voter demographics.

Fine-grained geolocation data improves how researchers measure neighborhood racial and ethnic context. These measures can reveal contextual effects that are often obscured by coarse geographic units.

Long lines at polling places reduce voter confidence in the fairness and efficiency of elections. These effects are strongest among voters who experience delays and among historically marginalized groups.

Research on American political institutions and democratic governance.

Research on American political institutions and democratic governance.

Members who are party leaders or electorally vulnerable are more likely to attend caucus meetings, while those with seniority or who vote less with their party are less likely to do so. Attendance is driven by the pursuit of private benefits such as information and agenda influence.

Legal and political constraints significantly reduce the likelihood that presidents will act unilaterally. Presidents are more likely to issue executive orders when courts and Congress are less likely to oppose them, indicating that constraints are binding, not merely symbolic.

Research on American political institutions and democratic governance.

Research on American political institutions and democratic governance.

Public attitudes toward unilateral presidential power are surprisingly consistent and largely unaffected by contextual framing–-except in explicitly political contexts. Even with different presidents or justifications, support for unilateral action remains low and stable.

There is no significant difference in public approval between direct presidential action and delegation to a commission. The public also sees no difference in the perceived effectiveness of policies formed through these two avenues.

Incorporating geolocation data allows researchers to connect individual survey responses to detailed information about respondents’ communities. This linkage reveals that local context significantly shapes political attitudes, especially on issues like immigration and economic policy.

Research on American political institutions and democratic governance.

Research on American political institutions and democratic governance.

Citizens tend to reward incumbents for disaster relief spending and punish them for slow or ineffective responses, regardless of actual preparedness. Disasters also exacerbate inequalities in political attention and resource allocation.

Presidents consistently behave in a particularistic manner, directing federal spending and administrative attention to swing states and core partisan areas. Rather than acting as neutral national leaders, they exploit executive control over the bureaucracy to serve political goals.

Presidents disproportionately direct federal aid to counties with co-partisan governors, particularly during election years. This pattern holds across both Democratic and Republican administrations, suggesting a systematic partisan logic in executive resource allocation.

Presidents are more likely to act unilaterally when public support is high and when institutional checks–-such as congressional opposition–-are weak or fragmented. The study finds that political conditions, not legal constraints, are the dominant factors in presidential decision-making.

Presidents act particularistically, directing disproportionate federal resources to counties in swing states and to core partisan constituencies, especially during reelection campaigns. They prioritize electoral advantage over national interest.

The Electoral College incentivizes campaigns to focus disproportionately on swing states and overlook safe states, leading to unequal representation and resource allocation. The system magnifies the influence of a small number of voters in competitive areas.

Governors receive credit or blame for Medicaid expansion decisions. Voters in states that expanded Medicaid were more likely to support incumbent governors, especially when they perceived personal or community benefits.

People are more supportive of disaster aid when it is framed as universal and not targeted toward specific groups. This reflects a general preference for broad-based government programs over particularistic ones.

Legislators are more likely to support particularistic legislation benefiting the auto industry when their districts contain more auto workers, but this effect diminishes on broader or more ideologically contested legislation.

Research on American political institutions and democratic governance.

Local economic indicators–-especially foreclosures, unemployment, and gas prices–-significantly influence how political independents evaluate national economic performance. These effects are particularly strong among less partisan and less politically informed voters.

Optical scanning machines demonstrate superior accuracy compared to hand-counted paper ballots. The tabulation error rate for optically scanned ballots was approximately 0.56%, compared to 0.87% for hand-counted paper ballots (excluding outliers). This represents roughly a 50% improvement in tabulation accuracy with machine counting.

Yes. Voters are more likely to support incumbent presidents (or their party’s nominee) when federal spending in their counties increases. The effect is strongest in battleground states and among liberal and moderate voters, especially when congressional co-partisanship clarifies partisan responsibility.

In 2008, McCain-Palin pursued a base strategy, campaigning in Republican strongholds, while Obama-Biden used a peripheral strategy focused on high-growth, less partisan counties. These choices reflect divergent campaign strategies with implications for electoral outreach.

Presidents are significantly more likely to issue disaster declarations to competitive states. These actions bring electoral rewards: a single declaration can yield more than a one-point gain in statewide vote share.

Presidents often try to take credit for new jobs, but their success depends on partisan alignment and media coverage. Co-partisans are more likely to believe presidential claims, while out-partisans are skeptical or unaffected.

Presidents gain electoral support in counties that receive disaster declarations and federal assistance, but only when the response is timely and well-publicized. Voters appear to reward presidents for responsiveness, not just for objective conditions.

Research on American political institutions and democratic governance.

Research on American political institutions and democratic governance.

The authors argue for a broader reassessment of presidential effectiveness that includes institutional leadership, long-term policy change, and normative considerations. They caution against over-reliance on popularity or legislative tallies as measures of presidential success.