Unilateral Inaction: Congressional Gridlock, Interbranch Conflict, and Public Evaluations of Executive Power
Research Question
When Congress blocks a president’s agenda, does unilateral action improve or worsen public evaluations relative to policy inaction?
Main Finding
Across multiple policy domains, respondents react negatively when presidents use unilateral power instead of leaving policy unchanged. These penalties are largest among policy opponents but are often present even among policy supporters.
Research Design
National survey experiments that compare evaluations of presidents who face congressional inaction and then either accept the status quo or act unilaterally.
Data Employed
Survey data from a national sample with experimental vignettes on health care, immigration, and international sanctions, including respondent policy preferences and rule-of-law commitments.
Substantive Importance
The study highlights a core dilemma of modern presidency under gridlock: unilateral action may advance policy goals but can impose political costs rooted in public concern over constitutional process.
Research Areas
Presidential Power, Public Opinion, Unilateral Action, Legislative Gridlock, Survey Experiments
Citation
@article{nothing,
author = {Reeves, Andrew and Rogowski, Jon C.},
title = {Unilateral Inaction: Congressional Gridlock, Interbranch Conflict, and Public Evaluations of Executive Power},
journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
volume = {47},
number = {2},
pages = {427--457},
year = {2022},
}