Unilateral Inaction: Congressional Gridlock, Interbranch Conflict, and Public Evaluations of Executive Power
Research Question
Do presidents receive electoral rewards for successful policy achievements, or does good governance often go unnoticed?
Main Finding
Presidents frequently receive little or no electoral benefit from policy successes, especially when those policies are complex or lack visibility. Voters often fail to connect improved outcomes with presidential action.
Research Design
A combination of case studies and empirical analysis examining whether measurable policy achievements lead to changes in presidential approval or vote share.
Data Employed
Case-specific political data, including public opinion trends and electoral results, linked to major policy actions across multiple administrations.
Substantive Importance
This paper challenges assumptions about democratic accountability, suggesting that political incentives may not align with effective governance. It raises important questions about how and whether voters reward competence.
Research Areas
Presidential Power, Legislative Behavior, Democratic Accountability, Institutional Constraints, Quantitative Methods
Citation
@article{nothing,
author = {Reeves, Andrew and Rogowski, Jon C.},
title = {Unilateral Inaction: Congressional Gridlock, Interbranch Conflict, and Public Evaluations of Executive Power},
journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly},
volume = {47},
number = {2},
pages = {427--457},
year = {2022},
}