Political Disaster: Unilateral Powers, Electoral Incentives, and Presidential Disaster Declarations
Research Question
Do presidents use unilateral authority over disaster declarations to pursue electoral advantage?
Main Finding
Presidents are significantly more likely to issue disaster declarations to competitive states. These actions bring electoral rewards: a single declaration can yield more than a one-point gain in statewide vote share.
Research Design
Quantitative analysis of disaster declarations across U.S. states from 1981 to 2004, before and after the expansion of presidential authority via the 1988 Stafford Act.
Data Employed
Archival data on presidential disaster declarations matched with electoral competitiveness and presidential vote returns.
Substantive Importance
This paper illuminates how presidents exploit unilateral powers not only for policy but also for electoral gain. It adds to broader debates about the strategic use of institutional authority and the politicization of emergency management.
Research Areas
Disaster Politics, Presidential Power, Swing States, Presidential Accountability, Quantitative Methods
Citation
@article{fema,
author = {Reeves, Andrew},
title = {Political Disaster: Unilateral Powers, Electoral Incentives, and Presidential Disaster Declarations},
journal = {Journal of Politics},
volume = {73},
number = {4},
pages = {1142--1151},
year = {2011},
}