The Electoral College and Presidential Particularism
Research Question
How does the Electoral College shape incentives for presidents to distribute policy benefits and government action across places?
Main Finding
The Electoral College’s unequal weighting of states incentivizes presidents to target benefits to electorally valuable constituencies. Evidence from grants, tariffs, and disaster declarations illustrates systematic presidential particularism.
Research Design
Institutional and legal analysis paired with empirical illustrations of executive distributive behavior across policy domains.
Data Employed
Evidence drawn from research on federal grant allocation, trade protection decisions, and presidential disaster declaration patterns, plus public-opinion evidence on reactions to targeted spending.
Substantive Importance
The article challenges the view that presidents are naturally universal representatives and shows how electoral institutions can generate unequal governance across citizens and places.
Research Areas
Presidential Politics, Electoral Institutions, Distributive Politics, Political Inequality, Democratic Accountability
Citation
@article{electoralcollege,
author = {Kriner, Douglas L. and Reeves, Andrew},
title = {The Electoral College and Presidential Particularism},
journal = {Boston University Law Review},
volume = {94},
number = {3},
pages = {741--766},
year = {2014},
}